Robust Trajectory and Transmit Power Design for Secure UAV
  Communications by Cui, Miao et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
80
6.
06
39
6v
1 
 [c
s.I
T]
  1
7 J
un
 20
18
1
Robust Trajectory and Transmit Power Design for
Secure UAV Communications
Miao Cui, Guangchi Zhang, Member, IEEE,
Qingqing Wu, Member, IEEE, and Derrick Wing Kwan Ng, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are anticipated to
be widely deployed in future wireless communications, due to
their advantages of high mobility and easy deployment. However,
the broadcast nature of air-to-ground line-of-sight wireless chan-
nels brings a new challenge to the information security of UAV-
ground communication. This paper tackles such a challenge in the
physical layer by exploiting the mobility of UAV via its trajectory
design. We consider a UAV-ground communication system with
multiple potential eavesdroppers on the ground, where the
information on the locations of the eavesdroppers is imperfect.
We formulate an optimization problem which maximizes the
average worst-case secrecy rate of the system by jointly designing
the robust trajectory and transmit power of the UAV over a given
flight duration. The non-convexity of the optimization problem
and the imperfect location information of the eavesdroppers make
the problem difficult to be solved optimally. We propose an
iterative suboptimal algorithm to solve this problem efficiently by
applying the block coordinate descent method, S-procedure, and
successive convex optimization method. Simulation results show
that the proposed algorithm can improve the average worst-case
secrecy rate significantly, as compared to two other benchmark
algorithms without robust design.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the advantages of high mobility and flexibility,
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have found interesting ap-
plications in wireless communications [1]–[5]. Line-of-sight
(LoS) channels usually exist between UAVs and ground nodes
in UAV wireless communication systems [6]. This has also
inspired a proliferation of studies recently on the new research
paradigm of jointly optimizing the UAV trajectory design and
communication resource allocation, for e.g. multiple access
channel (MAC) and broadcast channel (BC) [7], [8], inter-
ference channel (IFC) [9], and wiretap channel [10], [11]. In
particular, as shown in [7] and [8], significant communication
throughput gains can be achieved by mobile UAVs over static
UAVs/fixed terrestrial BSs by exploiting the new design degree
of freedom via UAV trajectory optimization, especially for
delay-tolerant applications. In [9], a joint UAV trajectory,
user association, and power control optimization framework
is proposed for cooperative multi-UAV enabled wireless net-
works. However, legitimate UAV-ground communications are
more prone to be intercepted by potential eavesdroppers on
the ground, as compared to terrestrial wireless communica-
tion systems, which gives rise to a new security challenge.
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Fig. 1. A UAV (Alice) communicates with a ground node (Bob) with K
potential eavesdroppers (Eves) on the ground.
Although security can be conventionally handled by using
cryptographic methods adopted in the higher communication
protocol layers, physical layer security is now emerging as a
promising alternative technology to realize secrecy in wireless
communication [12]. One widely adopted performance metric
in the physical layer security design is the so-called secrecy
rate [13], at which confidential information can be reliably
conveyed. For secure UAV communications, a joint UAV
trajectory and transmit power control design framework has
been proposed in [10], where the average secrecy rate is
maximized by proactively enhancing the legitimate link and
degrading the eavesdropping link via UAV trajectory design
in addition to power adaptation. However, the location of the
eavesdropper is assumed to be perfectly known in [10], which
is overly optimistic. In practice, although the UAV can estimate
the location of a potential eavesdropper by applying an camera
or synthetic aperture radar [16], the eavesdropper may remain
silent to hide its existence and thus the location estimation is
expected suffering from errors. As a result, existing security-
enabled techniques based on the assumption of perfect location
information of eavesdroppers may result in significant degra-
dation on security performance. Moreover, there may be more
than one eavesdroppers trying to intercept the legitimate UAV-
ground communication in practice. In this scenario, the UAV
transmitter needs to steer away from multiple eavesdroppers
and at the same time approach its intended receiver as close as
possible to enhance secrecy rate. Hence, designing the UAV
trajectory in such a scenario is an interesting but challenging
problem, which has not been addressed in [10].
In this paper, we consider secure legitimate UAV-ground
communications via robust joint UAV trajectory and transmit
power design in a practical scenario, where there are multiple
2eavesdroppers on the ground, as shown in Fig. 1. The UAV
only knows the approximate regions in which the eavesdrop-
pers are located while the exact locations of the eavesdroppers
are unknown. We aim to maximize the average worst-case
secrecy rate over a given flight duration of the UAV, subject to
its mobility constraints as well as its average and peak transmit
power constraints. The main contributions are summarized as
follows.
• The considered problem is intractable and obtaining the
globally optimal solution is difficult due to its non-
convexity and semi-infinite numbers of constraints. To
tackle the intractability, we propose an efficient sub-
optimal algorithm to solve this problem, based on the
block coordinate descent method, S-Procedure, and the
successive convex optimization method.
• Since the proposed algorithm takes into account and
provides robustness against the imperfect location infor-
mation of multiple eavesdroppers, it is more suitable for
practical applications, as compared to the existing work
on secure UAV communications [10], [11].
• Simulation results show that the proposed algorithm can
improve the average worst-case secrecy rate significantly,
compared to other benchmark schemes assuming perfect
location information of the eavesdroppers or ignoring the
eavesdroppers.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a UAV-ground communication system, where
K eavesdroppers (Eves) on the ground try to intercept the
legitimate communication from a UAV (Alice) to a ground
node (Bob), as shown in Fig. 1. We express locations in the
three-dimensional Cartesian coordinate system. Without loss
of generality, we assume that Bob locates at (0, 0, 0), which is
perfectly known by Alice. For k ∈ K , {1, . . . ,K}, the exact
location of Eve k, denoted by (xk, yk, 0) in meters (m), is not
known, but its estimated location, denoted by (xEk , yEk , 0) in
m, is assumed to be known. The relation between the actual
and the estimated x-y coordinates of Eve k is given by
xk = xEk +∆xk, yk = yEk +∆yk, (1)
respectively, where ∆xk and ∆yk denote estimation errors on
xk and yk, respectively, and satisfy the following condition
(∆xk,∆yk) ∈ Ek , {(∆xk,∆yk)|∆x
2
k +∆y
2
k ≤ Q
2
k}, (2)
where Ek denotes a continuous set of possible errors. Thus,
Eve k can be regarded as locating in an uncertain circular
region with center (xEk , yEk , 0) and radius Qk.
It is assumed that Alice flies at a constant altitude H
in m, which is specified for safety considerations such as
building avoidance [9]. Thus, Alice’s coordinate over time is
denoted as (x(t), y(t), H), 0 ≤ t ≤ T , where T in seconds
(s) is its flight duration. To facilitate trajectory design for
Alice, we quantize the flight duration T into N sufficiently
small time slots with equal length dt. Since dt is small
enough, Alice can be regarded as static within each slot.
Thus, Alice’s trajectory over the duration T can be represented
by a sequence {(x[n], y[n], H)}Nn=1. We let (x[0], y[0], H)
and (x[N + 1], y[N + 1], H) denote Alice’s initial and final
locations, respectively, and then write the mobility constraints
of Alice as
(x[n+1]−x[n])2+(y[n+1]−y[n])2 ≤ (vmaxdt)
2, ∀n, (3)
where vmax denotes the maximum speed of Alice.
The channel from Alice to Bob is assumed to be LoS
channel [9], [14], [15]1. Thus, the power gain of the channel
from Alice to Bob in slot n is given by
gAB[n] = β0d
−2
AB [n] =
β0
x2[n] + y2[n] +H2
, (4)
where β0 denotes the power gain of a channel with reference
distance d0 = 1m [9], and dAB[n] =
√
x2[n] + y2[n] +H2
denotes the distance between Alice and Bob in slot n. Simi-
larly, the channel from Alice to Eve k can be assumed to be
LoS channel, whose power gain in slot n is given by
gAEk [n] =
β0
(x[n]− xk)2 + (y[n]− yk)2 +H2
. (5)
Let P [n] denote the transmit power of Alice in slot n, and P¯
and Ppeak denote the average power and peak power of Alice,
respectively. Thus, we write the average and peak transmit
power constraints of Alice as
1
N
N∑
n=1
P [n] ≤ P¯ , (6a)
0 ≤ P [n] ≤ Ppeak, ∀n. (6b)
To ensure that (6a) is a non-trivial constraint, we assume P¯ <
Ppeak. Then, we can express the achievable rate from Alice to
Bob in slot n in bits/second/Hertz (bps/Hz) as
RAB[n] = log2
(
1 +
P [n]gAB[n]
σ2
)
= log2
(
1 +
γ0P [n]
x2[n] + y2[n] +H2
)
, (7)
where γ0 = β0/σ
2 and σ2 is Gaussian noise power at the
receiver. Similarly, we express the achievable rate from Alice
to Eve k in slot n in bps/Hz as
RAEk [n] = log2
(
1 +
γ0P [n]
(x[n]− xk)2 + (y[n]− yk)2 +H2
)
.
(8)
With (7) and (8), the average worst-case secrecy rate from
Alice to Bob over the flight duration T in bps/Hz is [13]
Rsec =
1
N
N∑
n=1
[
RAB[n]−max
k∈K
max
(∆xk,∆yk)∈Ek
RAEk [n]
]+
,
(9)
where [x]+ , max(x, 0).
For secure the communication from Alice to Bob, we jointly
design the trajectory and transmit power of Alice to maximize
the average worst-case secrecy rate in (9) subject to its
mobility and power constraints in (3) and (6). The optimization
variables include Alice’s trajectory and transmit power over
N time slots, which are denoted as x , [x[1], . . . , x[N ]]
†
,
y , [y[1], . . . , y[N ]]
†
, and P , [P [1], . . . , P [N ]]
†
, where †
denotes the transpose operation. The problem is formulated as
follows, where the constant term 1/N in (9) has been dropped,
1Measurement results in [6] show that the LoS channel model is a good
approximation for UAV-ground communications in practice even if the UAV
flies at a moderate altitude, e.g., 85m.
3max
x,y,P
N∑
n=1
[
RAB[n]−max
k∈K
max
(∆xk,∆yk)∈Ek
RAEk [n]
]+
(10)
s.t. (3), (6).
Problem (10) is difficult to solve optimally because of the
following reasons. First, the operator [·]+ introduces non-
smoothness to the objective function. Second, the objective
function is still not jointly concave with respect to x, y,
and P even without [·]+. Third, the infinite number of
possible (∆xk,∆yk) makes (10) an intractable semi-infinite
optimization problem. In the following section, we propose a
computational efficient iterative suboptimal algorithm to solve
problem (10) approximately.
III. PROPOSED ALGORITHM FOR PROBLEM (10)
We first tackle the non-smoothness of the objective function
of problem (10) by using the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Problem (10) is equivalent2 to the following
problem:
max
x,y,P
N∑
n=1
[
RAB[n]−max
k∈K
max
(∆xk,∆yk)∈Ek
RAEk [n]
]
(11)
s.t. (3), (6).
Proof. DenoteW ∗1 andW
∗
2 as the optimal values of problems
(10) and (11), respectively. First, since [x]+ ≥ x, ∀x, we have
W ∗1 ≥W
∗
2 . Next, denote (x
∗,y∗,P∗) as the optimal solution
to (10), where P∗ = [P ∗[1], . . . , P ∗[N ]]†. Let f(P [n]) =
RAB[n]−maxk∈Kmax(∆xk,∆yk)∈Ek RAEk [n]. We construct a
feasible solution (xˆ, yˆ, Pˆ) to (11), such that xˆ = x∗, yˆ =
y∗, and the elements of Pˆ are obtained as: if f(P ∗[n]) ≥ 0,
Pˆ [n] = P ∗[n]; otherwise Pˆ [n] = 0. Denote the objective value
of (11) attained at (xˆ, yˆ, Pˆ) as Wˆ . The newly constructed
solution (xˆ, yˆ, Pˆ) ensures that Wˆ = W ∗1 . Since (xˆ, yˆ, Pˆ) is
feasible to (11), it follows that W ∗2 ≥ Wˆ and thus W
∗
2 ≥W
∗
1 .
Therefore, W ∗1 = W
∗
2 , which completes the proof.
Although problem (11) is more tractable, it is still difficult
to solve due to its non-convexity. Nevertheless, we observe that
the optimization variables can be partitioned into two blocks,
i.e., (x,y) and P, which facilitates the algorithm design for
solving problem (11) via the block coordinate descent method
[9], [17]. Specifically, we solve (11) by solving the following
two sub-problems iteratively: sub-problem 1 optimizes P un-
der given (x,y); while sub-problem 2 optimizes (x,y) under
given P, as detailed in the next two subsections, respectively.
In the end, we summarize the overall algorithm and show its
convergence.
A. Solution to Sub-Problem 1
For given (x,y), sub-problem 1 can be written as
max
P
N∑
n=1
[
log2(1 + αnP [n])− log2(1 + βn)
]
s.t. (6), (12)
where
αn =
γ0
x2[n] + y2[n] +H2
, βn =
γ0
mink∈K θk,n
, (13)
θk,n = min
(∆xk,∆yk)∈Ek
(x[n]− xk)
2 + (y[n]− yk)
2 +H2. (14)
2In this paper, the word “equivalent” means that both problems share the
same optimal solution.
By substituting (1) and (2) into (14), θk,n can be obtained as
θk,n =
{
H2 dk ≤ Qk,
(dk −Qk)
2 +H2 dk > Qk,
(15)
where dk =
√
(x[n] − xEk)
2 + (y[n]− yEk)
2. The optimal
solution to problem (12) can be obtained as [12]
P ∗[n] =
{
min
(
[Pˆ [n]]+, Ppeak
)
αn > βn,
0 αn ≤ βn,
(16)
where
Pˆ [n] =
√(
1
2βn
−
1
2αn
)2
+
1
λ ln 2
(
1
βn
−
1
αn
)
−
1
2βn
−
1
2αn
.
(17)
In (17), λ ≥ 0 is a parameter to ensure that the constraint (6a)
is satisfied at the optimal solution, which can be determined
by bisection search [17].
B. Solution to Sub-Problem 2
By setting Pn = γ0P [n], sub-problem 2 can be expressed
as (18) shown at the top of next page, which cannot be
solved optimally in polynomial time due to its non-convexity.
By introducing slack variables u , [u[1], . . . , u[N ]]† and
t , [t[1], . . . , t[N ]]†, we first consider the following equivalent
problem:
max
x,y,u,t
N∑
n=1
[
log2
(
1 +
Pn
u[n]
)
− log2
(
1 +
Pn
t[n]
)]
(19a)
s.t. min
(∆xk,∆yk)∈Ek
(x[n]− xk)
2 + (y[n]− yk)
2 +H2
≥ t[n], ∀n, k, (19b)
x2[n] + y2[n] +H2 − u[n] ≤ 0, ∀n, (19c)
t[n] ≥ H2, ∀n, (3).
Problems (18) and (19) have the same optimal solution of
(x,y), since the constraints (19b) and (19c) are active at
the optimal solution to problem (19). This can be proved by
contradiction: if constraints (19b) and (19c) are inactive, the
objective value of (19) can be improved by increasing t[n]
(decreasing u[n]). Hence, we can focus on solving problem
(19). However, problem (19) is still intractable, since there
is an infinite number of (∆xk,∆yk) in constraint (19b) due
to the continuous nature of Ek. Now, we convert (19b) into
equivalent constraints as follows. First, we substitute (1) and
(2) into (19b) and rewrite it as
∆x2k +∆y
2
k −Q
2
k ≤ 0, ∀k, (20a)
− (x[n] − xEk −∆xk)
2 − (y[n]− yEk −∆yk)
2
−H2 + t[n] ≤ 0, ∀k. (20b)
Next, according to S-Procedure [17], since there exists a
point (∆xˆk,∆yˆk) (e.g., (∆xˆk,∆yˆk) = (0, 0)) such that
∆xˆ2k + ∆yˆ
2
k − Q
2
k < 0, the implication (20a) ⇒ (20b) holds
if and only if there exists ξk[n] ≥ 0 such that
Φ(x[n], y[n], t[n], ξk[n])  0, ∀k, n, (21)
where
Φ(x[n], y[n], t[n], ξk[n])
=

 ξk[n] + 1 0 xEk − x[n]0 ξk[n] + 1 yEk − y[n]
xEk − x[n] yEk − y[n] −Q
2
kξk[n] + ck[n]

 , and
4max
x,y
N∑
n=1
[
log2
(
1 +
Pn
x[n] + y2[n] +H2
)
− log2
(
1 +
Pn
min
k∈K
min
(∆xk,∆yk)∈Ek
(x[n]− xk)2 + (y[n]− yk)2 +H2
)]
s.t.(3). (18)
ck[n] = x
2[n]− 2xEkx[n] + x
2
Ek
+ y2[n]− 2yEky[n] + y
2
Ek
+H2 − t[n]. (22)
By replacing (19b) with (21) and introducing slack variables
Ξ , [ξ1, . . . , ξK ], where ξk , [ξk[1], . . . , ξk[N ]]
†, we rewrite
problem (19) into an equivalent form:
max
x,y,u,t,Ξ
N∑
n=1
[
log2
(
1 +
Pn
u[n]
)
− log2
(
1 +
Pn
t[n]
)]
(23a)
s.t. Φ(x[n], y[n], t[n], ξk[n])  0, ∀k, n, (23b)
t[n] ≥ H2, ξk[n] ≥ 0, ∀k, n, (23c)
(3), (19c).
The objective function in (23a) is non-concave, since log2(1+
Pn
u[n] ) is convex. Moreover, the constraint (23b) is non-convex,
since the terms x2[n] and y2[n] contained in ck[n] (see (22))
are non-linear. Thus, problem (23) is difficult to be solved
optimally due to its non-convexity. We propose an iterative
algorithm to find an approximate solution to problem (23) as
follows. First, the algorithm assumes a feasible point xfea ,
[xfea[1], . . . , xfea[N ]]
†
, yfea , [yfea[1], . . . , yfea[N ]]
†
and ufea ,
[ufea[1], . . . , ufea[N ]]
†
, which is feasible to (23). Then, by using
the first-order Taylor expansions of log2(1 +
Pn
u[n] ), x
2[n] and
y2[n] at ufea[n], xfea[n] and yfea[n], respectively,
log2
(
1 +
Pn
u[n]
)
≥ log2
(
1 +
Pn
ufea[n]
)
−
Pn(u[n]− ufea[n])
ln 2(u2fea[n] + Pnufea[n])
, (24)
x2[n] ≥ −x2fea[n] + 2xfea[n]x[n], (25)
y2[n] ≥ −y2fea[n] + 2yfea[n]y[n], (26)
problem (23) is approximately transformed to
max
x,y,u,t,Ξ
N∑
n=1
−
Pn(u[n]− ufea[n])
ln 2(u2fea[n] + Pnufea[n])
− log2
(
1 +
Pn
t[n]
)
(27a)
s.t. Φ˜(x[n], y[n], t[n], ξk[n])  0, ∀k, n, (27b)
(3), (19c), (23c).
where
Φ˜(x[n], y[n], t[n], ξk[n])
=

 ξk[n] + 1 0 xEk − x[n]0 ξk[n] + 1 yEk − y[n]
xEk − x[n] yEk − y[n] −Q
2
kξk[n] + c˜k[n]

 , and
c˜k[n] = −x
2
fea[n] + 2xfea[n]x[n]− 2xEkx[n] + x
2
Ek
− y2fea[n]
+ 2yfea[n]y[n]− 2yEky[n] + y
2
Ek
+H2 − t[n]. (28)
Note that problem (27) is a semidefinite programming prob-
lem, which can be optimally solved by the interior-point
method [17].
Algorithm 1 Proposed Algorithm for Problem (10).
1: Initialize P(0), x(0), y(0), and u(0). Set m = 0.
2: repeat
3: Set m← m+ 1.
4: Let xfea = x
(m−1), yfea = y
(m−1) and ufea = u
(m−1).
Solve problem (27) under given P(m−1) to obtain
(x(m),y(m)).
5: Solve problem (12) under given (x(m),y(m)) to obtain
P(m).
6: until The fractional increase of the objective value is
smaller than a threshold ǫ > 0.
Remark 1: Since (25) and (26) are lower bounds for x2[n]
and y2[n], respectively [17], we have ck[n] ≥ c˜k[n] and thus
Φ(x[n], y[n], t[n], ξk[n])  Φ˜(x[n], y[n], t[n], ξk[n]), (29)
which means that (27b) implies (23b). Hence, the solution to
problem (27) must be a feasible solution to problem (23).
Remark 2: Since (24) is a lower bound of log2(1 +
Pn
u[n] )
[17], problem (27) maximizes a lower bound of the objective
function of (23). This lower bound is equal to the objective
value of (23) only at (xfea,yfea,ufea), so the objective value
of problem (23) with the solution to problem (27) is equal to
or greater than that with the solution (xfea,yfea,ufea).
C. Overall Algorithm
We summarize the detail of the overall algorithm in Algo-
rithm 1, which solve problems (12) and (27) alternatively and
iteratively until it converges. Since as shown in the previous
two subsections, the objective value of problem (11) with the
solutions obtained by solving problems (12) and (27) is non-
decreasing over iterations and the optimal value of problem
(11) must be finite, the solution obtained by Algorithm 1
can be guaranteed to converge to a suboptimal solution [9].
Algorithm 1 is suitable for UAV applications, since it has
a complexity of O
[
Nite(4N +KN)
3.5
]
and can obtain the
solution in polynomial time, where Nite is the iteration number
[17].
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
This section provides simulation results to verify the per-
formance of our proposed robust joint trajectory and transmit
power design algorithm, as compared to the following two
benchmark algorithms: 1) non-robust joint trajectory and trans-
mit power design; 2) best-effort trajectory design with equal
transmit power [10]. Specifically, the non-robust algorithm
only has the estimated locations of Eves and treats them as
perfect information. Thus, it jointly designs the UAV trajectory
and transmit power control by using Algorithm 1 assuming
Qk = 0, ∀k. The best-effort algorithm performs equal transmit
power allocation over time and designs Alice’s trajectory in
the following heuristic best-effort manner: Alice flies to the
location right above Bob at speed vmax, then hovers there,
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Fig. 2. Trajectories and average worst-case secrecy rates of different algorithms.
and finally flies at speed vmax to reach the final location
at time T . If Alice does not have sufficient time to reach
the location above Bob, it will turn its direction midway
and fly to the final location directly. The initial feasible
points for the proposed robust and benchmark non-robust
algorithms are generated by the best-effort algorithm. There
are K = 2 Eves, whose estimated horizontal coordinates
are (xE,1, yE,1) = (−200, 0)m and (xE,2, yE,2) = (200, 0)m,
respectively, and Q1 = 20m and Q2 = 80m. The other param-
eters are set as follows: H = 100m, vmax = 10m/s, dt = 0.5s,
γ0 = 80dB, Ppeak = 4P¯ , (x[0], y[0]) = (−400,−200)m,
(x[N ], y[N ]) = (400,−200)m, and ǫ = 10−4.
Fig. 2(a) shows the trajectories of Alice by applying differ-
ent algorithms when P¯ = −5dBm. It is observed that when T
is small (e.g., T = 80s), the trajectories obtained by the robust
and non-robust algorithms are very similar, since the flexibility
in trajectory design is limited as Alice is required to fly from
the initial location to the final location in a given duration T .
As T increases, the flexibility in designing efficient trajectory
increases. This magnifies the differences between the robust
and non-robust algorithms. When T is sufficiently large (e.g.,
T = 160s), by these two algorithms, Alice first flies at its
maximum speed in an arc path to keep away from Eve 1
and reaches a certain point near Bob; then it hovers at that
point as long as possible, and finally flies to the final location
along an arc path bypassing Eve 2 at its maximum speed.
However, in the proposed robust algorithm, the hovering point
is on the left of Bob; while in the non-robust algorithm, the
hovering point is directly above Bob. This is because although
the distances from the estimated locations of Eves 1 and 2 to
Bob are equal, the radius of the uncertain region of Eve 1 is
smaller than that of Eve 2. Considering the worst case, the
proposed robust algorithm adjusts the hovering point closer
to Eve 1 and farther from Eve 2 to strike a balance between
enhancing the legitimate link from Alice to Bob and degrading
the quality of the eavesdropping links from Alice to Eves 1
and 2, while the non-robust algorithm fails to strike such a
balance by treating Eve 1 and Eve 2 equally.
Figs. 2(b) and 2(c) show the corresponding average worst-
case secrecy rates of all algorithms versus the flight duration
T and average power P¯ , respectively. In both figures, it can be
observed that the secrecy rates of all algorithms increase with
T and P¯ . In particular, the proposed robust algorithm signif-
icantly outperforms the other two benchmark algorithms. In
Fig. 2(c), it is observed that the secrecy rates of all algorithms
are saturated when P¯ is high. This is because as shown in (7)–
(9), the secrecy rate maximization problem (10) is independent
on the transmit power P [n] and only depends on the UAV
trajectory in the high transmit power regime. Furthermore, Fig.
2(c) shows that although the non-robust algorithm outperforms
the best-effort algorithm, the secrecy rate gap between them
becomes smaller as P¯ increases. This is because the non-
robust algorithm ignores the location estimation errors of Eves
1 and 2, and thus suffers from the performance loss. The
above results demonstrate the importance and the potential
performance gain brought by the robust joint trajectory and
transmit power design.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper investigated a secure UAV communication sys-
tem when the locations of the eavesdroppers are not per-
fectly known as in the practical scenario. A robust joint
trajectory and transmit power design algorithm was proposed
to maximize the average worst-case secrecy rate subject to
the UAV’s mobility constraints as well as its average and
peak transmit power constraints. Simulation results showed
that the proposed joint design algorithm which considers the
location uncertainties of Eves can improve the worst-case
secrecy rate performance significantly, as compared to two
benchmark algorithms without considering the uncertainties
of the eavesdroppers’ location information.
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